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ABSTRACT: La guerra de guerrillas 
is one of the most known of Che 
Guevara’s works. Providing a 
political-ideological analysis of this 
book, I aim to demonstrate that Che 
Guevara should not be considered 
only a man of action, but also a 
political thinker and theorist. To 
analyze the book, I will use the 
Gramscian concepts of hegemony 
and War of Manoeuvrer/War 
of Position as an interpretative 
framework. 
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1 INTRODUCTION
The one hundredth anniversary of the Russian Revolution 
is an appropriate moment to reflect on its repercussions on the 
world and, more specifically, on Latin America. Latin America was 
profoundly influenced by the October Revolution during the lifes-
pan of the Soviet Union but, differently from Eastern Europe or 
the former USSR, in Latin America the US victory in the Cold War 
did not mean capitulation and obeisance to the dominant capita-
list ideology. Because of profound historical reasons, one hundred 
years after the Russian Revolution Latin America obstinately refu-
ses to conform to Western ideological dogmas, and expresses its 
opposition in a variety of forms. Among the long-term consequen-
ces of the October Revolution in Latin America, it is impossible to 
overemphasise the importance of the Cuban Revolution and the 
influence of its two main leaders, Fidel Castro and Ernesto “Che” 
Guevara.
Ernesto Guevara is today to many a pop icon, and his image 
can be found reproduced on a number of products, just as any 
of the latest Hollywood actors.1 His mythical figure, which beca-
me an icon across the world from the 1960s, and even more so 
after his death, is often associated with that of a disinterested 
revolutionary, an action man, a restless freedom fighter ready to 
give his life for any people he thought needed his help, as even-
tually happened in Bolivia in 1967. This widespread image clashes 
strongly with the idea that Guevara might indeed have been an 
intellectual, a political thinker and theorist, apart from a guerrillero 
with the machine gun always at hand. In this article I will provide 
a political and ideological analysis of Guevara’s book La guerra de 
guerrillas using the Gramscian concepts of hegemony and of war 
of manoeuvre/war of position as an interpretative framework. 
By doing this, I aim to demonstrate that Che Guevara should not 
only be considered a guerrilla leader, but also a thinker and an 
ideologue.  
1 For the fortune of Che Guevara’s figure even out of politics, see Casey (2009).
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2 CHE A THINKER?
Hugo Troncoso argues that Guevara can be indeed be defined 
an intellectual, though a particular one, who unites intellectual and 
practical – military – activity (TRONCOSO, 2004). Michael Löwy, on 
the other hand, summarises Che Guevara’s thought in the defi-
nition of “revolutionary humanism,” a special humanism which 
requires deep care for all peoples of the world and direct interven-
tion in their emancipation (LÖWY, [1997?]). Though Guevara was 
a Marxist-Leninist, we should not forget that the Cuban Revolution 
led by him and Castro, as the most successful and enduring sover-
eign struggle in Latin America, was rooted in anticolonial, Afro-
Cuban and labour struggles from the 1700s. Guevara and Castro 
were certainly influenced by older Latin American thought, like 
that of the Cuban intellectual José Martí,2 and they inevitably 
influenced each other during their years of guerrilla and of rule 
together.3 Guevara was also aware of the thought of the Cuban 
Communist Julio Antonio Mella, who integrated Martí with Marx, 
and he de facto developed an independent economic thought 
while he served as minister of Industry.4 Guevara’s attempt to 
develop a Marxist theory apt to Latin American conditions also 
shows similarity with the thought of another great Latin American 
Marxist, the Peruvian José Carlos Mariátegui,5 though I could not 
find any direct references to Mariátegui in Che’s writings, nor is he 
in Löwy’s list of authors read by Guevara (LÖWY, 1973). 
The role of Che Guevara as a guerrillero is well known, and 
clearly his strategic contribution to the Cuban Revolution was 
crucial for its final victory. His booklet La guerra de guerrillas6 is 
equally famous because he synthesised there the experience he 
2 See Martí (2005).
3 For a recent, original account of Fidel Castro’s thought in English see: 
Jayatilleka (2007).
4 Helen Yaffe from the London School of Economics recently published a 
thorough account of Guevara’s economic thought and practice while he 
was minister of Industry, and demonstrated that his thought had enduring 
consequences on Cuban economy up to the present day (YAFFE, 2009). 
5 About Mariátegui’s marxism, see Selfa (2017) and Mariátegui (2007). 
6 Throughout this article I will always refer to the book as reproduced in Guevara 
(1977).
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acquired during the Cuban Revolution, trying to present more 
general lessons for the success of a guerrilla movement in a Latin 
American country. In the analysis of La guerra de guerrillas which I 
present here, I argue that this booklet should not merely be consi-
dered a guerrilla manual. The book contains in fact much practical 
information on how one should organise a guerrilla movement, 
but that part of the book will not be the focus of this article. 
Analysed with care, La guerra de guerrillas shows Guevara’s 
ideas on the guerrilla war as a political movement, and as a war 
which is at the same time a war of manoeuvre and a war of posi-
tion (in Gramscian terms) adapted to Latin American conditions 
which should enable a revolutionary political movement to gain 
hegemony over the population (as we shall see later, specifically 
over the peasant population first, then over the urban). I borrow 
the terms “hegemony” and “war of manoeuvre/war of position” 
from the thought of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, as they 
are some of his most important contributions to Marxist thought, 
and they are in fact strongly linked. Since I will use them as an 
interpretative framework to read Guevara’s booklet, these related 
concepts require explanation.7 
For Gramsci, “hegemony” is part of a dichotomy which includes 
the other important concept of “dominance.” The two terms are 
absolutely not the same: “hegemony” is a form of cultural, political 
direction/monopoly over the masses – Gramsci sometimes even 
identifies “hegemony” with “democracy” (GRAMSCI, 1975) - while 
“dominance” implies a given power’s coercive means in order to 
keep in the saddle. Interestingly, Gramsci claimed that Marx had 
theorized this concept before him, and that Lenin had further elabo-
rated and applied it. In Marx “the ethical-political aspect of politics 
or the theory of hegemony and consensus is shortly contained, 
apart from the aspect of force and economy” (GRAMSCI, 1975, p. 
1056) and “the theorization and the realization of hegemony made 
by Ilici [the word used for Lenin in the Notebooks] was […] a great 
event” (GRAMSCI, 1975, p. 1315). Evidently, Gramsci thought that 
Lenin had successfully used this concept and practice to achieve 
power in Russia. 
7 A good explanation of the concept of hegemony is in Cospito (2011). 
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As Gramsci says in his Quaderni: “There can and must be a 
‘political hegemony’ even before going to the government and one 
cannot count only on power and on the material force it gives to 
exert political direction or hegemony” (GRAMSCI, 1975, p. 41). As 
we shall see, that is exactly what Che Guevara advocates in his 
Guerra de guerrillas: Guevarian guerrilla war implies both a “war 
of manoeuvre” (the military organisation of the revolution) and a 
“war of position”, that is a long work of political preparation and of 
“hegemony-gaining”.8 As Gramsci clarifies, “hegemony” can also 
be defined as “a combination of force and consensus which balan-
ce each other, without force surpassing consensus too much, but 
it appears supported by the consensus of the majority” (GRAMSCI, 
1975, p. 59). In a way, as I will argue, Guevara’s booklet is preci-
sely about reaching that majority through cultural and propaganda 
means, which are of course buttressed by armed action. 
Certain Gramscian interpreters may disagree with my intent to 
syncretise Guevarian guerrilla war with Gramscian hegemony. In 
fact, for decades Gramsci’s thought in the Prison Notebooks and 
especially his concept of hegemony was interpreted as a radical 
breach with Marxism-Leninism, meaning that for Gramsci armed 
struggle was no more viable nor advisable, and therefore diffe-
rent, softer versions of political struggle were needed. This view 
certainly gained much popularity because of its political influen-
ces, but is deceptive. It ignores the obvious fact that as a convict 
Gramsci was writing under censorship and under enormous pres-
sure, so it is hardly surprising that in the Notebooks he did not 
mention military means together with struggle for hegemony. All 
the Notebooks are in code, and to be seriously assessed they need 
to be read together with Gramsci’s journalistic writings, where he 
was freer (though never completely free). Even a very superficial 
confrontation of this kind shows that Gramsci’s thought can hardly 
be defined the thought of a pacifist or a Liberal, and that is why 
the comparison with Guevara is founded (BIANCHI; MUSSI, 2017). 
8 For an in-depth analysis of Gramscian war of manoeuvre and war of position 
and a discussion on its origins, see Egan (2014). 
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Gramsci uses the concept of “war of position” sometimes as a 
synonym for “hegemony” (GRAMSCI, 1975, p. 973) sometimes as 
a means to reach that hegemony. “War of position demands enor-
mous sacrifices from endless masses of population; therefore an 
unheard of concentration of hegemony is necessary” (GRAMSCI, 
1975, p. 802) to win this kind of war, storming a “powerful system 
of fortresses and earthworks” (GRASMCI, 1971, p. 233). The simi-
larity between Guevarian guerrilla war and this Gramscian term is 
all too obvious: I therefore argue that this Gramscian concept can 
be useful to re-interpret Guevara’s La guerra de guerrillas. As an 
appendix to his The Marxism of Che Guevara, Michael Löwy (1973) 
presents a useful list of works which are known to have been read 
by Che Guevara. Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Mao and Giap are present, 
but Gramsci is nowhere to be found. However, oral sources indi-
cate that Gramsci was translated and published in Cuba, and that 
Guevara did read him, though after writing La guerra de guerril-
las. Interestingly, Aurelio Alonso, from the Cuban Marxist journal 
Pensamiento Crítico, once told the Cuban scholar Antoni Kapcia 
that “Che was Gramscian without knowing it.”9 In fact, the gist 
of Guevara’s thought as presented in La guerra de guerrillas is so 
reminiscent of Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony and war of 
manoeuvre/war of position, that I dare use these concepts as an 
interpretative framework.
3 THE GUEVARIAN CONCEPT OF GUERRILLA WAR: A WAR 
OF MANOEUVRE/WAR OF POSITION TO REACH HEGEMONY
By way of introduction to my analysis, it is important first 
to point out that from the beginning of La guerra de guerrillas 
Guevara (1977) makes clear that this book was born out of the 
Cuban Revolution and of the guerrilla war on the Sierra Maestra. 
References to concrete examples and experiences of the Cuban 
revolutionary struggles are frequent, though Guevara (1977) often 
warns that local circumstances must be taken into considera-
tion and that the Cuban example is not a blueprint to be followed 
9  I am particularly grateful to Antoni Kapcia for pointing this out to me.
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blindly everywhere. At the outset, he makes clear that the Cuban 
Revolution had demonstrated three main elements which were 
crucial for all Latin America and which were the basic underpin-
nings of his theory. 
Firstly, Guevara (1977) argues that the organised people could 
win a war against a regular army. The second point is about the 
importance of the insurrectionary foco (“focus”): he argues that not 
all the conditions for a liberation war must necessarily be present 
from the beginning. He instead argues that it is the insurrectio-
nary foco which can bring them about. Thirdly, he argues that 
in Latin America the battlefield for social revolution must be the 
countryside. Che’s famous voluntarism is clearly visible in his 
first point: a regular army is by definition better armed, equipped 
and trained than a guerrilla movement, but the experience of the 
Cuban Revolution showed him that the army could be overcome. 
The initial guerrilla army would with time become a regular army 
(GUEVARA, 1977). The concept of insurrectionary foco is crucial 
in Che’s framework, as he sees the revolutionary guerrilla war 
as a catalyst, a progressive political movement which can create 
through its course the conditions of its success, if they were not 
present from the beginning. This Guevarian concept is the absolute 
negation of a mechanical and dogmatic interpretation of Marxism. 
Che Guevara’s conclusion that the successful battlefield for a 
liberation movement in Latin America is the countryside is also 
worth analysing. Néstor Kohan (2007) argues that Guevarismo 
is an application of Marxism to the conditions of Latin America, 
and the importance Guevara gives to the countryside and peas-
ants is the best proof of this. In doing so, Guevara departs from 
the most orthodox Marxist tradition, according to which the real 
revolutionary class is the factory proletariat, while the peasants, 
stuck in the “idiocy of rural life” are like a sack of potatoes not even 
able to represent themselves. However, Guevara argues, the mass-
es of the exploited in Latin America and in other underdeveloped 
countries were to be found in the countryside, and the countryside 
should have therefore been the starting point for the revolutionary 
movement, from which it could finally reach the cities through the 
weapon of the general strike. 
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The guerrilla, Guevara says, is an “agrarian revolutionary”, 
who “interprets the desires of the large peasant mass to be master 
of the land, master of its means of production, of its animals, of 
everything it has longed for throughout the years” (GUEVARA, 
1977, p. 34). “The economic base” of the struggle is “the aspiration 
to land ownership” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 34). According to Guevara 
(1977), an ideal is needed to carry out a revolutionary struggle in 
the countryside:
This ideal is simple, straightforward, without 
bigger aspirations, and, in general, it does not 
go very far, but it so firm, so clear, that for it 
you give your life without the least hesitation. 
It is, in almost all cases, the right to have a 
piece of one’s own land to work it and to en-
joy fair social treatment. (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 
67 – 68). 
“Among the workers,” however, that ideal entails “to have a 
job, to receive a suitable salary and also fair social treatment” 
(GUEVARA, 1977, p. 67 – 68). As Gramsci (1975, p. 461) said, 
“hegemony is political, but also and especially economic”. Going 
to the context of guerrilla war, the ideological-economic base of 
the struggle is not only of utmost importance to reach popular 
support but, as we shall see later, certain basic economic activities 
initiated and/or favoured by the guerrilla movement – land redis-
tribution, workshops – also contribute in gaining support, for they 
show the present and future sustainability of the new political-e-
conomic order. Apart from peasants and urban workers, however, 
the success of the revolutionary struggle may need the co-option 
of very different social strata. For example, Guevara (1977, p. 90) 
argues that “traders, professionals, and even priests” could be used 
as spies. 
Here, a comparison between the contexts of the Cuban and of 
the Russian Revolution is in order. In fact, in spite all the differen-
ces between the enormous Russian Empire and a small Caribbean 
island, the revolutionary processes in the two countries shared one 
similarity: the important role of the peasantry. Russia by the end 
of World War I was a country whose population was no less than 
80% peasant, with a very small factory proletariat concentrated in 
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a few main cities. This factory proletariat certainly had a role in 
the triumph of the revolution.10 However, the success of the revo-
lution would have been unlikely without the passive acquiescen-
ce –  more rarely the active support – of the peasantry. Lenin’s 
decree on land sanctioned the autonomous redistribution of land 
that the peasants had already been carrying out, thus sealing an 
uneasy “alliance” with the countryside (smychka). It was through 
this politically skilful concession to the “petty bourgeois” instincts 
of the Russian peasantry that Lenin secured the survival of the 
revolution. In his theory, Guevara is calling for a similar concep-
tion: the longing for agrarian reform of the Cuban campesinos 
was the driving force which could trigger the revolution. I do not 
know if Guevara knew in detail this characteristic of the Russian 
Revolution, but this similarity is nonetheless noteworthy. 
Here, two more relevant references to Gramsci are worth 
underlining. Firstly, immediately after the October Revolution 
Gramsci (1918) wrote a famous article titled “La rivoluzione 
contro il Capitale,” where italicising the word “Capital” he meant 
Marx’s book. In this article he shortly underlined the difference 
between Marx’s theoretical assumption according to which the 
Communist Revolution would have begun in developed capitalist 
economies and the practice of the October Revolution, since the 
Bolsheviks took power in a largely peasant and backward coun-
try. Gramsci (1918), however, defended the Bolsheviks’ choice, 
arguing that the practical conditions of the given moment justi-
fied their going “against” Marx’s Capital, and therefore criticised 
a dogmatic interpretation of Marxism. “Facts have gone beyond 
ideologies” (GRAMSCI, 1918, [no page]), he wrote. This cannot 
but remind us of Guevara’s conviction that social revolution could 
succeed in Latin America and in the Third World in general, the 
peasant nature of these countries notwithstanding. Secondly, the 
necessity of an alliance between the urban working class and 
the peasantry for a successful social revolution was also under-
lined by Gramsci, though he had of course the Italian context in 
mind, in an unfinished, yet important work on the Italian southern 
10  See Fitzpatrick (2008).
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question (GRAMSCI, 1966). Here we see one more point of simi-
larity between Gramsci and Guevara. Undoubtedly, the Guevarian 
agrarian strategy was also justified by very concrete technical and 
military factors, since the perfect location for a guerrilla war could 
not but be the countryside. In Guevara’s theory, cities and urban 
struggle are not neglected, but rather they come towards the end 
of the war, as we shall see. 
Guevara points out that, in order to be successful, the guerrilla 
war must be a “mass struggle, […] a people’s struggle” (GUEVARA, 
1977, p. 33) of which the guerrillas are only the armed vanguard. 
Without the support of the majority of the population, a guerril-
la movement cannot win. Moreover, he states that the guerrilla 
is a “social reformer” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 34). This strong claim 
accords closely with the role Gramsci gives intellectuals in his 
Quaderni (if we substitute “social reformer” with “intellectual”): 
there is not a class independent from intellec-
tuals, but every class has its intellectuals; but 
the intellectuals of the historically progressive 
class exert such a power of attraction that, fi-
nally, they end up in subordinating the intel-
lectuals of the other classes and in creating an 
environment of solidarity among all intellec-
tuals. (GRAMSCI, 1975, p. 42).
However, he says:
this phenomenon takes place ‘spontaneously’ 
in those periods in which that given class is 
really progressive, that is it pushes the entire 
society forward, not only satisfying its exis-
tential needs, but continuously enlarging 
its cadres for a continuous takeover of new 
spheres of activity. (GRAMSCI, 1975, p. 42). 
This last quote explains us the process of the Cuban Revolution 
gaining allies among other classes during the guerrilla war, as we 
shall see later. According to Guevara (1977), the guerrilla is not a 
simple armed civilian, but the bearer of an ideological struggle. S/
he should not only strive to increase the ranks of the guerrilla army 
and to acquire arms and ammunition – important steps of the war 
of manoeuvre to gain military dominance – but also carry out “mass 
popular work” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 39) in the countryside. The 
Guerrilla War and HeGemony: Gramsci and cHe
Tensões Mundiais, ForTaleza, v. 13, n. 25, p. 53-76, 2017   |  63
guerrilla should show “moral superiority” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 46) 
compared with the oppressing army by building education centres 
and by spreading revolutionary press. In fact, Paolo Spriano (1958) 
noted that “hegemony” is also a “political-ethical concept,” since 
it “assumes the ability of the ‘new Prince’ to become the leader 
of civil society” (SPRIANO, 1958, p. 541) (“new Prince” is another 
important Gramscian term that here indicates a political actor 
fighting for hegemony, though Gramsci arguably meant by this 
term the Communist Party). The similarity with Gramscian hege-
mony is striking, for among crucial means for maintaining hege-
mony Gramsci listed “school activity” and “journalism” (GRAMSCI, 
1975, p. 56).
However, Guevara (1977) says that the first and most impor-
tant education must be received by the guerrillas themselves as 
soon as they join the movement: “from the very beginning […] the 
social meaning” of the struggle should be explained, as well as 
the guerrillas’ “duties, finally clarifying in their minds and giving 
them moral lessons which will temper their character” (GUEVARA, 
1977, p. 80). Setting positive examples, according to Che, is one of 
the most important educational strategies: “the leaders must cons-
tantly offer the example of a crystalline and selfless life” (GUEVARA, 
1977, p. 80). Not that the exchange between the campesinos and 
the guerrillas should be one-way, according to Guevara. On the 
contrary, the guerrilla leaders could learn a lot from the peasants, 
and “as a product of this interaction of the guerrilla with his people, 
a progressive radicalisation arises which accentuates the revolu-
tionary characteristics of the movement and they give it a national 
dimension” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 63). A guerrilla war is an agrarian 
revolution, and “the fighting nucleus of the guerrilla army must be 
campesino”, because the “campesino is, evidently, the best soldier” 
(GUEVARA, 1977, p. 66).  
Precisely because the interaction of the guerrillas with the 
local population is so crucial, Guevara argued that the guerrilla 
should ideally be a local himself. To build hegemony, “the peasant 
must be […] helped technically, morally, economically and cultu-
rally” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 62): ultimately, the peasants will get 
a positive or negative impression of the guerrillas according to 
Marco Gabbas
64  |  Tensões Mundiais, ForTaleza, v. 13, n. 25, p. 53-76, 2017
their behaviour. Sometimes, guerrillas left idle because of lack of 
weapons could collaborate with the campesinos in agricultural 
work, and roads, shops and hospitals could be built. The guerrilla 
movement should do all possible not to impoverish the zone of its 
operations. Moreover, when the guerrilla movement is sufficiently 
confident to do so, it will create peasant organisations which will 
sow “the seed, the oral and written propaganda” (GUEVARA, 1977, 
p. 103). Che Guevara envisioned that in the first phase of the guer-
rilla war the rich peasants should be hurt “as little as possible” 
(GUEVARA, 1977, p. 62). Nevertheless, with the ongoing of the 
struggle, class contradictions in the countryside would progres-
sively exacerbate and the first revolutionary measures could be 
taken. Land and property in excess could be redistributed, land 
owned by enemies of the revolution could be seized and organised 
in cooperatives. 
The guerrilla struggle in itself should be an occasion to prac-
tice absolute justice within its own ranks, according to Guevara. 
This should be firstly done with the distribution of any items from 
food and clothing to tobacco. From “the last man to the leader 
everyone must receive the same treatment,” because the “soldiery, 
very sensitive to justice, measures rations with critical spirit,” and 
“even the slightest favouritism with anyone shall not be permit-
ted” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 75). The life of the guerrilla war fosters 
feelings of “brotherhood” among the comrades, and “benefi-
cial emulations” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 80) should be promoted. 
Moreover, even discipline within the guerrilla movement must 
have “educational characteristics”: the guerrillas should not deal 
with “games which do not have a social function and which tend 
to dissolve the morale of the soldiery” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 77), and 
alcohol should be prohibited. In the spirit of the guerrilla war being 
a mass struggle, Guevara favoured widespread sabotage but was 
sceptical of terrorist methods which, he argued, were not effective 
and brought dreadful reprisals against the population. 
I have so far sketched the general lines of Che Guevara’s concept 
of revolutionary guerrilla war, which I assimilate to the Gramscian 
concept of reaching hegemony through war of manoeuvre and 
war of position. Clearly, what we can see in Che Guevara’s thought 
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is a fight for military dominance (war of manoeuvre) which goes 
pari passu with the process of gaining hegemony (war of position). 
In fact, according to Guevara, the two are strongly linked. It is only 
by continuous, consistent and efficient educational and propa-
ganda work predominantly among the peasants – but, as we have 
seen, to a lesser extent among urban workers and other sectors of 
society – that the guerrilla army will gain momentum. It is the ideo-
logical success of the movement which enables it to improve from 
consciousness to self-consciousness. In Gramsci’s words: 
The consciousness of being part of the hege-
monic force (that is political consciousness) 
is the first phase of a further and progressi-
ve self-consciousness, that is of unification 
of practice and theory […] That is why […] 
the development of the concept-fact of hege-
mony represented a great ‘philosophical’ and 
political-practical progress. (GRAMSCI, 1975, 
p. 1042).
Moreover, “the science of politics develops in the phase of 
struggle for hegemony” (GRAMSCI, 1975, p. 473). In Gramscian 
terms, in order to succeed the guerrilla army needs to become the 
organic, collective intellectual of the rising peasant masses. 
Che Guevara outlines in his book the development of a success-
ful guerrilla war (GUEVARA, 1977), and his narrative may be useful 
to see step after step the process of hegemony-building. Before 
even beginning the guerrilla struggle, the small group must under-
go “ideological and moral preparations” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 132) 
in secrecy, aside from military training. Then in the first, mainly 
rural phase, the initial small, isolated, and potentially unsuccessful 
group of guerrilleros makes contact with “peasants dispossessed 
of their land or in struggle to maintain it and with young idealists 
of other classes” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 92). The guerrilla army thus 
becomes more and more popular, and more and more people begin 
to join it: “the work among the masses” makes “every peasant an 
enthusiast of the liberation war” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 92). At the 
next step of the struggle for hegemony, the guerrilla group is “the 
head of a large movement with all the characteristics of a small 
government” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 92), and as such begins to exert 
Marco Gabbas
66  |  Tensões Mundiais, ForTaleza, v. 13, n. 25, p. 53-76, 2017
its prerogatives: justice is administered, laws are sanctioned and 
taxes are collected. Both the internal and the external front are 
thoroughly organised. Guevara makes the example of the Cuban 
guerrilla war, where the guerrillas managed to issue a civil as well 
as a penal code, and rules for land reform (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 
104). 
“The work of indoctrination of the peasants’ and workers’ 
masses, if they [the workers] are close” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 92-93), 
continues, and more and more of them are attracted to the cause. 
“[P]opular organisations of workers, professionals and peasants” 
have to sow “the seed of revolution in the respective masses, 
explaining, giving out the publications of the rebellion to read; 
showing the truth” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 107). Che Guevara was 
in fact convinced that “one of the characteristics of revolutionary 
propaganda must be the truth” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 107). Schools 
are also opened to train and politically educate new guerrillas. The 
guerrilla war is a learning process which, as mentioned earlier, 
goes both ways: the leaders of the guerrillas learn from the local 
population and become more experienced through time. Finally, 
the guerrilla movement penetrates the cities from the countrysi-
de until the final victory. Continuing the Gramscian comparison, 
this last phase recalls the “city of the future” which goes through 
the marsh of helplessness and smashes the walls of the “old city” 
conquering it (GRAMSCI, 2011, p. 03 – 06). 
But, after having taken power, what has to be done to maintain 
it? Che Guevara makes clear that the operation of destruction of 
the old must go hand in hand with that of construction of the new. 
The enemy regular army must be subject to “systematic destruc-
tion” (GUEVARA, 1977, p.133), and so all the institutions of the 
old regime. The old guerrilla army must be organised in a new 
way to become a regular one and to be prepared to face possible 
attacks. The problem is that, according to Guevara, in this phase 
“thousands of last-hour revolutionaries, good or bad,” join the new 
army, and they must therefore undergo “accelerated and intensive 
courses of revolutionary indoctrination” (GUEVARA, 1977, p.134). 
Che Guevara points out that the “revolutionary indoctrination 
which must give the necessary ideological unity to the people’s 
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army, is the basis of national security in the long, and in the short 
run as well” (GUEVARA, 1977, p.134). This phase might be called 
the phase of consolidation and defence of the acquired hegemony. 
4 ORGANISING THE GUERRILLA FRONT, GAINING 
HEGEMONY
The chapter of Guevara’s book dedicated to the organisation 
of the guerrilla front is also very useful to see how this process 
may be interpreted as a war of position for hegemony, and incudes 
subsections on the role women could play in the guerrilla war, and 
on propaganda and indoctrination (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 95 – 126). 
Guevara was convinced that women could play a crucial role in a 
guerrilla war, notwithstanding that fact that “in all our countries, 
of colonial mentality, there is a certain underestimation” of them 
which becomes “a real discrimination” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 107). 
Apart from being able to carry out all tasks usually reserved for 
men, according to Guevara, “in rigid fighting life, the woman is a 
companion who puts in the qualities typical of her sex” (GUEVARA, 
1977, p. 107). Women can carry important messages, or even 
ammunition carefully disguised under their skirts. Apart from more 
“classical” but nonetheless important tasks like cooking, women 
could perform good education and propaganda work. In fact, 
women can “teach basic literacy and even revolutionary theory, 
to the local campesinos, essentially, but also to the revolutionary 
soldiers” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 107). Moreover, the “organisation of 
schools […] must be done counting fundamentally on women who 
can instil more enthusiasm into children and enjoy more sympathy 
of the school population” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 107 - 108). Women 
could be good social workers investigating the “economic and 
social ills” of the zone, and could be crucial in medical assistan-
ce, since they have a “tenderness infinitely superior to that of the 
rough comrade in arms” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 108).    
Not surprisingly, Guevara (1977) dedicates a special section to 
the role of revolutionary propaganda. The importance of propa-
ganda to attain hegemony and win the guerrilla war is present 
throughout the whole text, but in this section it is discussed in 
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more detail. “A whole team and an organisation” (GUEVARA, 1977, 
p. 118) must be dedicated to propaganda. It must be organised 
for both the external and internal fronts, though the two sections 
should be under centralised direction. According to Guevara, 
propaganda publications should follow the line that “truth, in the 
long run, results beneficial for the peoples” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 
118). There must be different kinds of newspapers. Apart from 
general ones, many others must be directed to specific sectors of 
the population. At least one aimed at the peasants and one aimed 
at urban workers are needed. The workers’ newspaper will be very 
important because it will motivate them for a general strike when 
the moment comes. Particular attention to propaganda will help 
to develop the critical mass which is needed to guarantee hege-
mony. “The great slogans of the revolutionary movement must be 
explained” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 119), and special newspapers can 
be printed for the soldiers of the regular army. Finally, Guevara 
argues that radio is possibly an even more important propaganda 
instrument than the press.
The propaganda which will be most effective, 
notwithstanding everything, the one which 
will be made heard most freely in the who-
le national range and which will arrive at the 
reason and the feelings of the people, is the 
oral one via radio. In the moments in which 
the war fever is more or less beating in each 
one of the members of a region or a country, 
the inspiring, inflamed word increases this 
same fever and imposes it in each one of the 
future fighters. It explains, teaches, rouses, 
determines in friends and foes their future po-
sitions. (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 119 -120).
Guevara insists that radio propaganda, too, must be based on 
the fundamental principle of truthfulness: “radio must be ruled by 
the fundamental principle of popular propaganda, that is, truth; 
telling the truth is preferable, small it its dramatic dimensions, to 
a big lie charged with glitz” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 120). “Doctrinal 
orientations” must be delivered through the radio together with 
“practical lessons to the civilian population” and “speeches of the 
leaders of the revolution” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 120).  
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The indoctrination of rebel soldiers is a fundamental part of 
propaganda work, and Guevara (1977) analyses it together with 
their more general training. In fact, he maintains that indoctrina-
tion must be a crucial part of conscripts’ schools. In conscripts’ 
schools, apart from the training for military life, “indoctrination 
must be done for the most possible time and with the utmost dedi-
cation” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 123). In fact, the new volunteers enlist 
“without a clear conception of why they are coming, only with 
totally widespread concepts like on freedom, freedom of the press 
etc., without any ideological foundation” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 123). 
Their ideological education must include surveys of the country’s 
history, together with economic elements and with explanations 
on why determined historical actors react to injustice in particu-
lar ways. Reading must be encouraged, especially “progressive 
readings” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 124). This kind of training, in Che 
Guevara’s opinion, provides the soldiers with “an internal disci-
pline, which must be entirely justified with reasons” (GUEVARA, 
1977, p. 124). 
5 DEFENCE OF HEGEMONY
Che Guevara (1977) concludes his book with some considera-
tions on the present and future of the Cuban Revolution. He clari-
fies that “this national revolution, fundamentally agrarian, but with 
the enthusiastic participation of workers, people from the middle 
class and, still today with the support of industrialists, has acqui-
red continental and even world importance” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 
135 – 136). With its victory, the revolution could finally carry out 
important acts like agrarian reform and the law on mines, which 
left few doubts about its real nature. Che Guevara notes that, after 
the revolution, Cuba “assumes the leadership of the anticolonial 
struggle in America” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 139). But Guevarian 
thought goes further: he thought, in fact, that he was living in 
“the dawn of a new era of the world” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 140), in 
which a general revolution would explode from complementary 
anticolonial struggles of America, Africa and Asia. 
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Towards the end of the book, Guevara concludes by sket-
ching the possible strategies of attack that US imperialism could 
implement against Cuba. The first way could be sheer economic 
terrorism. Another way, which Guevara lucidly envisioned, was 
the elimination of one or more of the revolutionary leaders: the 
Castro brothers, and Che himself. The CIA did succeed in killing 
Guevara in 1967, but was less fortunate with Fidel Castro, since 
he recently died aged ninety having survived no less than 638 
attempts and planned attempts on his life, and having seen off 9 
US presidents. Then, direct military aggression was also possible. 
As we know, this was attempted but with disastrous results for US 
imperialism at the Bay of Pigs in 1961. Che Guevara was convinced 
that a possible military aggression should be prevented with mass 
militarisation and education of the people. Again we see the vital 
role of political education to maintain hegemony. “A patient and 
complete education” of the masses was needed:
education which is born or has its foundation 
in the basic knowledge which anyway must 
be concentrated on the reasoned and true ex-
planation of the deeds of the Revolution. The 
revolutionary laws must be commented on, 
explained, studied, in each meeting, in each 
assembly […] The contact of the people with 
politics, that is, the contact of the people with 
its desires [,] deeds, laws, decrees and reso-
lutions, must be constant. (GUEVARA, 1977, 
p. 148).   
Guevara called for real moral vigilance in this phase, and 
pointed out that the “cult of work, especially collective work and 
with collective ends, must be developed […] Brigades of volun-
teers who will build bridges, docks or dams, who will build school 
towns” will be more and more united and will demonstrate “their 
love for the revolution with their deeds” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 149). 
According to Guevara, revolutionary zeal will be the glue which 
will unite the army with the rest of the population. Quoting Camilo 
Cienfuegos, Guevara clarifies that the “army is the people in 
uniform” (GUEVARA, 1977, p. 149). 
Guerrilla War and HeGemony: Gramsci and cHe
Tensões Mundiais, ForTaleza, v. 13, n. 25, p. 53-76, 2017   |  71
6 CONCLUSION
The figure and works of Ernesto Guevara were crucial in the 
development of anti-imperialist struggles in the latter part of the 
Cold War, and even afterwards. One of the aims of this article was 
to show that Guevara should not be reduced to a pop icon devoid 
of meaning, and that Guevarismo still retains a theoretical value 
today. I argue that Che’s life and works reward continuing study. At 
the same time, I do not maintain that he should be idolised or seen 
in radical contradiction with other Marxist thinkers and activists 
because of his being “defeated,” similarly to figures like Antonio 
Gramsci and Rosa Luxemburg. This is indeed the risk Domenico 
Losurdo warns us of. Talking about Gramsci and Guevara, Losurdo 
says that they are “two personalities whose thought and whose 
action presuppose the Bolshevik Revolution and the development 
of the international Communist movement, [...] decades and deca-
des of decisive world history which took place after Marx’s death” 
(LOSURDO, 2011, p. 26).  Losurdo (2011) argues that Gramsci’s 
and Guevara’s deeds are unthinkable without Lenin’s influence, 
but Lenin is often ignored by many who profess admiration for 
Guevara and Gramsci.
Although very different from each other, 
Gramsci and Che Guevara have in common 
the fact that they are two defeated in some 
way, who could not participate in the ma-
nagement of the power sprung by the re-
volution and who had instead to suffer the 
consequences of the existing political-social 
order. Therefore, the martyrdom, and not 
the political thought and action of these two 
eminent representatives of the international 
Communist movement are appreciated, since 
they refer to an obstinately removed history. 
(LOSURDO, 2011, p. 26 – 27).
I argue that this is the way in which we contemporaries should 
proceed in our critical assessment of Guevara’s deeds and works. 
His human and moral lesson cannot be overemphasised, but we 
should analyse his thought in the light of his deeds and of his 
ideological predecessors. Che Guevara’s legacy is unthinkable 
without Marx’s, Lenin’s, and possibly even Mao’s thought. In fact, 
Marco Gabbas
72  |  Tensões Mundiais, ForTaleza, v. 13, n. 25, p. 53-76, 2017
Guevarismo may be defined as a form of Marxism-Leninism adap-
ted to and used in the conditions of the Third World, especially 
Latin America.   
In this article I have sought to demonstrate that Guevara, who 
indeed was a man of action, should not be reduced to that. A care-
ful analysis of his book La guerra de guerrillas shows that Guevara 
saw the guerrilla war as a revolutionary struggle for hegemony, 
to be reached not only through military means but with enor-
mous importance accorded to political and ideological education. 
The guerrilla army had indeed to become the Gramscian organic, 
collective intellectual of the whole people in order to succeed in 
his struggle. In the end, it was supposed to basically fuse with the 
people itself. Che Guevara has often been gratuitously accused of 
lack of realism and utopianism. In reality, his works like La guerra 
de guerrillas and his deeds show the exact opposite. His obses-
sion with the popular militarisation of Cuba was dictated by the 
necessity of defence against US military force. Guevara went to 
fight in the Sierra Maestra when he was already traumatised by 
the fate of Arbenz’s government in Guatemala, which was over-
thrown in 1954 in a way for being too democratic. Decades of 
bloody US-backed upheavals in Latin America have demonstrated 
that Guevara’s concerns were well-founded. 
Guevarian thought and practice can be defined as utopian only 
in the sense the late Eduardo Galeano so aptly explained, that is, 
only if we metaphorically consider utopia as a figure standing at 
the horizon which you have to reach by walking. No matter how 
much you walk, you will never reach her. Galeano answered the 
question on why one needs utopia by simply saying: you need 
utopia to walk. Jorge Castañeda felt the need to point out in his 
biography of Che Guevara that his “ideas, his life and opus, even 
his example, belong to the past” and that, as “such, they will 
never be current again” (CASTAÑEDA, 1998). Though his book is 
a sound research work, he tends to present Guevara as a popu-
lar icon merely attached to the 1960s and to 1968 in particular, 
as a romantic revolutionary whose fight was driven by a psycho-
logical (or psychopathological?) longing for martyrdom. In conclu-
sion, Castañeda (1998) argues, today there is nothing of current 
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importance left by this character. However, Castañeda’s account 
was probably premature. In his article, Michael Löwy ([1997?]) 
pointed out that Castañeda himself  expressed doubts in a 1997 
Newsweek article whether it would be “really possible to redistrib-
ute, with democratic methods, wealth and power, concentrated 
in the hands of rich and powerful elites, transforming the ances-
tral social structure of Latin America” (LÖWY, [1997?]). Castañeda 
titled his article “Rebels Without Causes”, therefore comparing Che 
Guevara to the character interpreted by James Dean in a 1955 film, 
a tormented adolescent who was in fact a “rebel without a cause”. 
Nevertheless, Castañeda had to admit that we “may discover, by 
the end of the century […] that Che Guevara had a point, after all” 
(CASTAÑEDA, 1997 apud LÖWY, [1997?]).
Writing at the end of the 20th century, Löwy points out that “Che 
Guevara’s message, thirty years after his death, is a torch which 
continues to burn, in this dark and cold end of century” (LÖWY, 
[1997?]). Paraphrasing Walter Benjamin, he also notes that “the 
memory of the defeated and assassinated ancestors is one of the 
strongest sources of inspiration of the revolutionary action of the 
oppressed” (LÖWY, [1997?]). This is probably truer of Che than of 
any other figure. In fact, he argues:
In all the revolutionary demonstrations 
in Latin America of the last years, from 
Nicaragua to El Salvador, from Guatemala to 
Mexico, the presence, at times invisible, of 
‘guevarismo’ is perceived.  Its legacy appears 
in the collective imagination of the fighters, 
as much as in their debates on the methods, 
the strategy and the nature of the struggle. 
Che’s message can be considered a seed 
which germinated, during these thirty years, 
in the political culture of the Latin American 
left, producing limbs, leaves and fruit. Or like 
one of the red threads with which the dreams, 
the utopias, and the revolutionary actions are 
woven, from Patagonia to the Río Grande. 
(LÖWY, [1997?], no page].  
Writing at the beginning of the 21st century, I cannot but 
subscribe to the words of Michael Löwy. In the year of the one 
hundredth anniversary of the October Revolution, a lot of moralising 
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condemnation is done, and many celebrate the fortunate return 
to “normality.” History, contrary to the wishes and predictions of 
the historian and State Department functionary Fukuyama, has 
refused to end. Today, Che Guevara’s thought has more signifi-
cance than ever. More precisely, many examples could be made 
on how Guevarian lessons could be of use in the present-day Latin 
American situation, but here I will make just two. 
In the past years, the “pink tide” had given hope and concre-
te improvement in the lives of many Latin American peoples. 
However, one of the main pillars of this Latin American rebirth, the 
Bolivarian Revolution, is now facing a serious crisis whose final 
outcomes are still impossible to predict. This impasse certainly had 
many causes, first of all the economic crisis, but possibly also the 
death of Hugo Chávez, the leader who personified the revolution 
and whose charisma and authority were the cement which united 
the Bolivarian experiment. It is safe to say that the achievements 
of the Bolivarian Revolution were possible thanks to the strong 
hegemony it could secure over large sectors of the Venezuelan 
people. However, recent upheavals in Venezuela have demons-
trated that political hegemony can be achieved, but it can also be 
lost. Venezuela is therefore in front of a very difficult task, since 
the only way for the country to survive without losing its indepen-
dence is to reach a new hegemony.
The present situation of Cuba also arises the interest of the 
world observers. Obviously, the Cuban Revolution has been 
sentenced to death since its very birth, but it spectacularly mana-
ged to survive up to the present day, even going through the diffi-
culties of the Special Period. To many hostile commentators who 
saw Cuba as nothing more but a personal dictatorship, the fall of 
the Cuban regime was only a matter of time: once Fidel was dead, 
Cuba could not but totally embrace capitalism and the disinte-
rested help of its powerful northern neighbour. Things went in a 
different way, and one of the reasons is that from the very begin-
ning the Cuban Revolution consciously and skilfully avoided the 
senseless personality cult so typical of other Socialist regimes – 
notwithstanding Fidel Castro’s attachment to power until he could 
(JAYATILLEKA, 2007) – and it successfully managed to build a 
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strong political hegemony. “The next revolution”, that is Cuba’s 
complete regime-change, has already been predicted (ERIKSON, 
2008), but whether or not it will take place, and anyway the kind 
of change Cuba will undergo, depends on what kind of hegemony 
Cuban Socialism will be able to build. It would be naïve to think 
that Cuba is today devoid of problems, but the failures of capitalist 
restoration in Eastern Europe and in the former USSR should be 
an important memento not to fall into total renunciation of the 
Socialist legacy. 
REFERENCES
BIANCHI, A.; MUSSI, D. Gramsci and the Russian Revolution. Jacobin 
Magazine, [online], 2017. Available at: <https://www.jacobinmag.
com/2017/04/gramsci-russian-revolution-lenin-trotsky-soviets>. 
Accessed on: Nov. 27, 2017.
CASEY, M. Che’s Afterlife: The Legacy of an Image. New York: Vintage 
Books, 2009.
CASTAÑEDA, J. G. Rebels Without Causes. Newsweek, [online], Jan. 13, 
1997. 
______. Compañero: Life and Death of Che Guevara. New York: Vintage 
Books, 1998.
COSPITO, G. Egemonia. In: FROSINI, F.; LIGUORI, G. (ed.). Le parole di 
Gramsci. Roma: Carocci, 2011. p. 74 - 92. 
EGAN, D. Rethinking War of Manoeuvre/War of Position: Gramsci and the 
Military Metaphor. Critical Sociology, v. 40, n. 4, p. 521 – 538, 2014. 
ERIKSON, D. P. The Cuba Wars: Fidel Castro, the United States and the 
Next Revolution. New York: Bloomsbury, 2008.
FITZPATRICK, S. The Russian Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008.
GRAMSCI, A. La questione meridionale. Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1966.
______. Selection from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International 
Publishers, 1971.
______. Quaderni del carcere. v. I – II. Torino: Einaudi, 1975.
______. Odio gli indifferenti. Milano: Chiarelettere, 2011.
Marco Gabbas
76  |  Tensões Mundiais, ForTaleza, v. 13, n. 25, p. 53-76, 2017
______. La rivoluzione contro il Capitale. Il Grido del Popolo, Rome, 5 
jan. 1918. Available at: <https://www.marxists.org/italiano/gramsci/17/
rivoluzionecontrocapitale.htm>. Accessed on: Nov. 27, 2017.
GUEVARA, E. C. La guerra de guerrillas. In: ______. Obras 1957-1967: La 
acción armada. v. I. Havana: Casa de las Américas, 1977. p. 25 - 149.
JAYATILLEKA, D. Fidel’s Ethics of Violence: The Moral Dimension of the 
Political Thought of Fidel Castro. London: Pluto Press, 2007.
KOHAN, N. La concepción de la revolución en el Che Guevara y en el 
guevarismo. Rebelión, [online], 01 Oct. 2007. Available at: <http://www.
rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=57007>. Accessed on: Nov. 27 2017.
LOSURDO, D. Fuga dalla storia?: la rivoluzione russa e la rivoluzione 
cinese oggi. Napoli: La casa di Pitagora editrice, 2011.
LÖWY, M. The Marxism of Che Guevara: Philosophy, Economics, and 
Revolutionary Warfare. Monthly Review Press, New York, p. 119 - 123, 
1973.
______. El humanismo revolucionario del Che. [S.l.]: [s.n.], [1997?]. 
Available at: <https://www.nodo50.org/americalibre/anteriores/11/
lowy11.htm>. Accessed on: Feb. 12, 2017.
MARIÁTEGUI, J. C. 7 ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana. 
Caracas: Fundación Biblioteca Ayacucho, 2007. 
MARTÍ, J. Nuestra América. Caracas: Fundación Biblioteca Ayacucho, 
2005.
SELFA, L. Mariátegui and Latin American Marxism. ISR – International 
Socialist Review, [online], i. 96, 2015. Available at: <https://isreview.
org/issue/96/mariategui-and-latin-american-marxism>. Accessed on: 
Nov. 24, 2017.
SPRIANO, P. Intervento. In: ______. Studi Gramsciani: Atti del convegno 
tenuto a Roma nei giorni 11-13 gennaio 1958. Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1958. 
TRONCOSO, H. E. C. Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, intelectual revolucionario: 
notas para un estudio crítico de su Pensamiento. Sociedad y Discurso, 
Aalborg, Denmark, v. 5, n. 22, p. 01 – 22, 2004. Available at: <http://vbn.
aau.dk/files/62990143/SyD5_cancino.pdf>. Accessed on: Feb. 12, 2017.
YAFFE, H. Che Guevara: The Economics of Revolution. Houndmills: 
Palgrave, 2009.
